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Abstract
In business information systems, many of the questions of both ethics and
business benet can be usefully considered in terms of levels and type of open-
ness to be applied. In this paper, I examine both the ethical implications of
such choices, but also the business benets to be gained, from choosing a more
open path. software licensing issues, communication protocols, data formats
and customer relations are all considered through this lens.
1 Introduction
When developing information systems, whether they be standalone business process
support programs for single machines or internet-spanning user-generated content
distribution mechanisms, various choices that need to be made in the specication,
design and implementation of that system can be characterised as a choice about
openness or closure. Sometimes these choices are binary in nature (open or closed,
with no in-between), whereas at others it's the level of open-ness that's the question,
with a setting available somewhere between fully open and fully closed. In this paper
I discuss the implications of various types of choice for various business scenarios,
and their relation to general principles of information ethics, such as those espoused
by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and the British Computer
Society (BCS) in their relevant codes of ethics.
I begin with a discussion of the business issues to be considered in free soft-
ware versus proprietary licenses and the question of software idea patents, then
consider the issue of communication protocols. The related concept of openness in
data formats is presented next, followed by the concept of community rather than
customers. A brief case study of the issue of openness in anti-malware information
nishes the main body of the paper, with the nal section deriving conclusions about
the benets or not of openness in these various elds.
2 Code
When the words \open" and \closed" are mentioned to software developers, the
rst ideas to come to mind are almost certainly the license under which a piece of
software will be released: a free/open source license or a proprietary one. In addition
to the other open or closed elements discussed below, this question itself is not so
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simple and clear-cut a question as it might appear. In addition to the question of
release license, and even this has more to it than a simple consideration, there are
also the questions of development environment and the individual rights of members
of the development teams, the highly vexing question of software idea patents, and
of source code escrow. These questions also need consideration by customers when
commissioning software as well as by development organisations.
2.1 Software Licenses
Software licensing is a complicated concept. As is well-documented in, for example,
[Williams, 2002], in the early days of computing, software was principally developed
by the hardware manufacturers as part of a package of selling expensive hardware
to clients, developed for in-house use or developed as part of research by academics.
That all changed in the 70s along with the development of personal computers. The
growing commoditisation of hardware computing capacity, as always happens with
commoditisation, drove down the price of the commoditised good, but also opened
up new opportunities for prot in related goods and services. In computing, this new
market was principally in programs to run on the machines. By the time Bill Gates
was complaining about unauthorised copying [Gates III, 1976] the lines began to
be drawn between the proprietary and free software approaches. By 1984, Richard
Stallman, already long involved in development of freely shared software such as
the Emacs text editor (whose non-legalistic \license" was a social contract and \dis-
tributed on a basis of communal sharing, which means that all improvements must
be given back to [Stallman] to be incorporated and distributed" [Williams, 2002])
announced the start of a new project: GNU (GNU's not Unix), dedicated to build-
ing a free (as in speech) version of the Unix operating system. After much discussion
and some soul-searching to nd the \sweet spot" for embodying the personal free-
dom \hacker" [Williams, 2002, Levy, 2001] ideology, the rst version of the GNU
Public License was produced, setting one of the guiding points of software licensing
ever since.
2.1.1 The Scope of a Software License
Since 1976 in the US1 computer software has been deemed an artistic or literary
endeavour attracting copyright in the individual expression (but not the \actual
processes or methods embodied in the program", see below on Software Idea Patents
2.3) that embodies that program. It was quickly decided that this extended not only
to the source code, which is the actual material written by the programmer, but
also to the resulting executable object code. Software is, of course, rather dierent
to other types of written work in that it is useless on its own without hardware on
which to run. However, a decent analogy can be made with music which for most
people2 written music is useless without instruments (and for those not musically
trained, musicians to play them) on which to execute the sheet music.
Arguments about the legal reach of software licenses have been in progress since
the rst licenses were issued. When one pays for software, what exactly is one
1Following fairly quickly in much of the developed world and more slowly elsewhere.
2Terry Pratchett's character Lord Vetinari, who reads sheet music for pleasure without the messy
business of musicians getting in the way, aside.
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buying? The settled legal view is that software is licensed, not sold. When one
\buys" software, one is entering into an agreement whose terms are principally set
by the license oered by the owner(s) of the copyright. This license may include
restrictions on how many times the software may be installed onto dierent ma-
chines, how many copies may be running at any one time, and certain elements of
the usage of the software. However, there are also terms which may not be placed
on the purchaser. Users have the right to \decompile" the program for the purpose
of \interoperability", that is to gure out how to make other programs communi-
cate with the purchased program. Users generally have the right to sell on a piece
of software (in the US, under the \rst sale" doctrine [Stek, 1997] and in the EU
under the \exhaustion of rights" doctrine [May, 2003]).
Network Associates Inc. included terms for its Virus Scan software (see section
6 below for anti-malware software as a case study in openness dilemmas) which
restricted users' discussion of the capabilities of the program, and in particular its
relative benchmark tests. The New York State Attorney General's Oce challenged
this license as a matter of public policy and won the court case3 arguing that re-
strictions such as this were an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech,
not justied in the protection of trade secrets or goodwill. It was further argued
that in particular the ability to discuss the capabilities and vulnerabilities (including
comparative benchmarking) of security software was an essential public good that
could not be over-ridden by contract terms.
As discussed in [Chandler, 2008, Loren, 2004] the enforceability of \shrinkwrap"4,
\click-wrap"5 and \browse-wrap"6 licenses have come under signicant scrutiny, as
have attempts to restrict who can use software.
Within the non-proprietary software community there are a range of positions
on how to license software. Some claim that any restriction on the freedom of others
to do what they will with software is wrong. This idea is embedded in the Berkeley
Software Development (BSD) license which simply requires that anyone distribut-
ing the source and/or object code acknowledge the original authors' copyright and
disclaims any liability. Other, such as the Free Software Foundation (FSF), which
develops and maintains the GNU General Public License (GPL) regard the share-
alike principle (taking someone else's work, and adding a small amount to it should
not allow you to deny similar rights to your users) as paramount to maintaining a
free information infrastructure. Contrary to the belief of some, the GPL does not
constrain programmers to distribute their amendments, not does it prohibit charg-
ing for providing the amended code. In practice, however, anyone who does charge
could easily nd their business model undermined by a single paying customer who
chooses to then pass the software along without charging a fee. The GPL does re-
quire that the amender gives the redistribution and derived work production rights
3 Spitzer v. Network Associates, Inc. dba McAfee Software 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Supreme Court
N.Y. 2003).
4Software sold in a cellophane-wrapped box, the details of the license being inside the box and
stating or implying that opening the cellophane wrapping constitutes agreement to the license.
5A software license whose terms are presented to the user when they attempt to install the
software. Typically, the user must select an \I agree" box or similar in order for the installation to
proceed.
6A software license approach legally discredited in the US by Specht v. Netscape No. 01-7860
(L) (2d Cir., October 1, 2002). A license appears somewhere on a web page which also includes a
link to download the software thus licensed.
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to anyone to whom they distribute the software. There are those who argue that
the GPL is not a \free" enough license, as mentioned above, and that by impos-
ing the share-alike principle they are infringing on others' rights. There are others
who argue that the GPL is no restrictive enough, but still in the name of \freedom".
Thus there are licenses such as the \Hacktivismo Enhanced-Source Software License
Agreement" which attempts to prohibit governments (in particular) from distribut-
ing amended versions of their software which have been altered to allow government
spying on citizens' computer usage (see www.hacktivismo.com/about/hessla.php).
2.1.2 The Ethics and Business of Choosing A License
The example of Microsoft (MS), which started complaining about unauthorised
copying7 of their software in 1976 and today are one of the world's largest compa-
nies, would seem to dictate that the only sensible business decision to make when
writing software is to use as strong a proprietary license as one can, and even to
reach as far into restricting competition as to limit the free speech of users with
respect to discussing any possible failings of the software with others. However,
as presented below, even for commercial operations and sound nancial reasons, a
strong proprietary license may not be the best choice even for commercial software
producers. For individuals and organisations commissioning software, or having
software written in-house and/or by contractors the issue is even more blurred.
In some ways it is unfortunate that the unpaid community eort element of the
Hacker Ethic[Raymond, 2001, Loren, 2004] has come to represent free software as a
concept so strongly. The volunteer hacker working on software in their free time,
donating their time and expertise for the altruistic good of the community, the thrill
of producing elegant code8 and the egoboo9 from public recognition of one's eorts
and skills has become not just the poster-child for free software but the only image
many have of free software developers. However, a signicant amount of free software
development is done by people during work time in ordinary paid computing jobs and
while a small proportion of this may be regarded as a \charitable contribution" by
the organisation, it is more often the organisational version of \scratching one's own
itch" than anything else. Other companies make free software pay suciently well
to fund its development in consultancy, bespoke development, or support contracts.
Where software is developed in-house, many managers see the development and
maintenance of this software as a costs centre only, and may seek to sell the software.
For many reasons this is almost always a mistake, since developing software is a risky
7Piracy is a hideous crime involving the armed hijack of a vessel at sea and the theft of the cargo
and even the vessel itself often while employing savage violence against the crew and any passengers.
The link between this heinous crime and unauthorised copying of material under copyright is one
drawn by those who cannot justify the status of their holding of copyright, and who must label the
act of copying as something so hideous that no one can argue against it as the only way of winning
their case. The author is with Richard Stallman on this usage and therefore describes it technically
as unauthorised copying. Even the \illegality" of such an action is uncertain in many cases without
deep examination of the circumstances | not all unauthorised copying is illegal.
8or, in unfortunately too many cases code which the hacker feels is elegant but which is in fact
uncommented unmaintainable spaghetti code
9A term from science ction fandom derived from \ego boost" to describe the pleasure gained
from recognition for voluntary works. The prevalence of science ction fans in early free software
and online communities transferred the term (and provided some of the impetus behind community
eorts as the driving force) to the free software community.
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business venture that non-specialists usually fail at, and in addition the software
may well represent (part of) the company's principal business advantage in it's
principal eld of operation. However, where the organisation in question is not a
competitive commercial player, but a public sector or non-prot organisation, then
the commercial advantage argument turns on its head. Since such organisations by
their nature should (though for various political reasons they do not always see this)
be interested in \raising the game" of others cooperatively. This is particularly true
in, for example, local government. In the UK, there has long been a tradition of
sharing in-house software between authorities. While often not released beyond the
\club" of UK local government, it is eectively a free software distribution model
within a closed group of separate entities.
So, if one is working within the public/non-prot sector, there is a strong ethical
argument that in-house software developments should be released under some form
of communal access agreement. Indeed, if there is potential for a broader utilisation
of such software beyond the relevant type of organisation, then a strong argument
can be made that there is an ethical duty to release the software more widely.
This argument has strengthened over the last fteen years (such software products
and sharing have existed long before then) with the development of eectively free
systems for distribution of such software, for example via the Free Software Foun-
dation's website or the Sourceforge site. As we discuss below in section 4, similar
arguments can be made regarding the ethical argument for public sector organisa-
tions to use open data formats and to make some of the data they generate freely
available in such formats.
Even for commercial companies with specic needs, developing in-house software
under a free software license may be a sensible business decision. The adoption of a
free software license approach allows the development team to incorporate elements
of existing free software as part of their system. In-house systems teams need to be
aware of the necessity to ensure that management, particularly management outside
the technical department, are aware of the decision to use free software and need to
keep good documentation on the origins of their code. In particular, it is incumbent
upon IT sta to ensure that any suggestion of taking in-house developed systems
and distributing them is provided with clear guidelines on the status of the inherited
code and the implications of its license for any such distribution.
2.1.3 Commissioning Software
So far we have focussed on the license adopted by an in-house team developing
software for internal use. However, many businesses use software company for their
bespoke IT needs. Questions of licensing on the side of the commissioning company
need careful consideration, which they often do not get. Many software houses will
take a line on licensing that tries to tie in the commissioning company to the software
house for future development work, and retains ownership of the commissioned work
by the software house, for possible re-use in other projects, and even development
into a package for general sale. Again, the commissioning company need to consider
their needs in the negotiations, and need to consider the future carefully. Larger
companies and public sector organisation, such as government departments, where
they commission software from a third party will often, though not always, take the
longer-term view and insist on some form of access to the source code. This can
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take a number of approaches, but can include transfer of ownership in the software,
shared rights, source code escrow and code audit rights.
2.1.4 Transfer of Ownership
A software house will typically demand higher payment for software developed with
a transfer of ownership compared to software in which the company retains some
or all of the rights. In fact, it may not be possible to transfer all of the rights
to the commissioning organisation. The software house may have developed a set
of libraries for various purposes some of which may already be used in previous
projects, and the use of which for future projects may be absolutely necessary for
their continued business. If the company has based some of their work on GPL
or LGPL10 then they may not own the rights themselves to transfer. If a software
house has the right skills to develop the software that the commissioning organisation
needs, then it is likely that a full transfer of rights would not be sensible for the
software house.
For the commissioning company, sole ownership is the equivalent of developing
the software in-house, without needing to employ the software developers directly
or on a long-term basis. It provides the benet that the software can be later
further developed in-house or by a third party, either for in-house use or for sale as
a product, a strategy already dismissed above.
2.1.5 Shared Ownership
Shared ownership is a shorthand for a number of dierent ways of licensing the
output of a piece of bespoke software. At one extreme the commissioning and
developing organisations have equal but separate rights to the output of the project
at the end. Each is free to develop the code further on their own or with other
parties, and neither is constrained as to how these further development may be
commercialised or used. At the other extreme, the commissioning company may
have full access to the source code and may use it and develop it for in-house use
themselves or bring in contractors to perform such development, but may not sell
the software to others nor pass on rights to third parties. The most common variant
of this kind of arrangement lies in the middle, with pre-existing libraries etc from
the software house being licensed for use by the commissioning company, perhaps
including a time- or type-limited right of access to updates (such as updates to new
versions of the operating system). The new software developed during the project
is then subject to the common ownership of the commissioning and developing
organisations as detailed above.
2.1.6 Source Code Escrow
Small software houses, like all small businesses, are in a precarious position. Without
any ill intent on behalf of the owners and management of such companies, they
10The GNU Lesser General Public License which allows other programs to call the relevant
software as a separate library without the \share-alike" element of the GPL coming into play for
the core program, only for any changes to the library.
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frequently fold and their records, including their source code base, may be deleted or
may end up in the hands of liquidators for whom their sole purpose is the realisation
of the maximum funds from those assets in as short a time as possible. When one
has commissioned software from a company which then goes under, the possibility is
that both the original source code and/or the clear chain of ownership and associated
rights, is lost. To defend against the negative impacts of this, but where the software
house is unwilling to agree to a transfer of rights or shared ownership, the source
code may be placed in \escrow": that is, it may be lodged with a trusted third party.
A properly drawn up escrow agreement provides the commissioning company with
both access to the source code and the equivalent rights of shared or transferred
ownership if and only if the software house ceases trading, or possibly on violation
of the contract. This ensures that the commissioning organisation is not left with a
set of running object code but no way of xing bugs or upgrading it. The trusted
escrow company ensures that the original software house's rights are not voided
until and unless they are out of business. Alternatively a contract providing the
code to the commissioner but no rights to do anything, except possibly read it, can
be agreed.
2.1.7 Code Audit Rights
The right to at least see the code of a commissioned piece of software, or even one
which is available o-the-shelf, may be a requirement for certain types of business.
Partly in response to concerns about deliberate backdoors placed in the dominant
MS Windows operating system from various non-US governments, and in reaction
to other pressures such as continuous accusations of monopoly leveraging from op-
erating system to oce software and back (see also section 4 on data formats) MS
introduced the \Shared Source Initiative" which provides users of, and developers
for, some of MS's products access to (part of) the source code of systems such as MS
Windows and MS Oce. Similar code auditing arrangements can be built into be-
spoke software development contracts, allowing representatives of the commissioner,
usually including contractors, the right to check the source code for security holes,
whether deliberate or inadvertent.
2.2 Open and Closed Development Environments
The output of a software project and the tools used to develop it have no technical
requirement to share license structures. For example, the use for a number of years of
a proprietary tool (BitKeeper) for controlling the source code of one of the most high
prole free/open source programs (the Linux Kernel, a vital part of the GNU/Linux
operating system) was very controversial. A license move by BitMover (the company
who produces BitKeeper) in 2002 [Shaikh and Cornford, 2003] which tried to restrict
use of BitKeeper and prevent developers of interoperable free software clients:
this License is not available to You if You. . . develop, produce, sell,
and/or resell a product which contains substantially similar capabilities
of the BitKeeper Software, or, in the reasonable opinion of BitMover,
competes with the BitKeeper Software .
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caused a signicant disagreement amongst Linux developers. The controversy was
somewhat lessened when BitMover released their own free software (GPL v.2) client
called bk-client to connect to BitKeeper repositories, although with limited capabili-
ties. The controversy was re-ignited in 2005 when BitKeeper withdrew their support
due to the eorts of some Linux developers to develop a full-featured client to con-
nect to the BitKeeper servers. As a result even Linus Torvalds nally shifted his
stance and engaged with other Linux developers to scratch their own source control
itch and produced the free software system Git, a source control system designed
for very large highly active projects.
2.3 Software Idea Patents
In 1979 the spreadsheet, often claimed as the killer app that ensured the success
of the personal computer in ordinary oce environments, was invented by Bricklin
and Frankston. They did not attempt to le a patent, although they did consider
it (a common myth is that patenting was not seriously considered by any program-
mers in the 70s). Bricklin describes their consideration on his personal website
www.bricklin.com/patenting.htm:
Why didn't we patent the spreadsheet? Were we stupid?
This is a very common question, since, by the late 1990's, software in-
ventions were routinely patented. Today, it seems negligent to ignore
patents. However, in 1979, when VisiCalc was shown to the public for
the rst time, patents for software inventions were infrequently granted.
. . . The publishers of VisiCalc . . . retained a patent attorney who met
with executives from Software Arts and Personal Software. The patent
attorney explained to us the diculty of obtaining a patent on software,
and estimated a 10% chance of success, even using various techniques
for hiding the fact that it was really software (such as proposing it as a
machine). Given such advice, and the costs involved, we decided not to
pursue a patent. . . .
By 1981 the situation had changed and software patents were being granted,
although this growth of the patent system has been far from universal, and both
the concept and its implementation in the US today remain controversial. The
inclusion of software purely as software (and not as part of a larger invention)
in the scope of the patent system outside the US has been one of the few fail-
ures of the US' commercial rules hegemony on so-called intellectual property rights
[Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002] over the past thirty years. At present, despite vari-
ous attempts by the European Patent Oce11 (EPO), various major international
rms who hold software patents in the US and would like to see them introduced
worldwide, and the US trade representatives [Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002], so far
the European Parliament has resisted attempts to introduce software patents. It
is a perennial issue, however, and as of writing yet another discussion of European
11It is alleged that as well as arguing on a policy-making level that software should be patentable
in the EU as it is in the US, it is often alleged that the EPO has deliberately stretched the rules,
or even broken them, in granting patents on software in an attempt to by pass the democratic
decision-making of both the EU and Member States and eectively introduce software patents by
grant rather than by statute.
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patent reform is underway, with various groups oering suggested wordings which
they all claim will simply clarify matters and reinforce the status quo. Of course
if one believes the allegations about the EPO then that status quo includes the
granting of patents on software in the EU.
Stallman, and other free software exponents (including those on the open source
side of the free/open source software philosophy) are vehemently opposed to software
idea patents. As they point out, software is inherently abstract except where it
controls a physical entity. Restricting the use of software concepts, it is claimed,
undermines not only the whole ethos of free software12 but would also undermine
the rest of the software industry, producing such ridiculous barriers to entry that
few others than today's software giants (MS, IBM, Oracle and Sun, all of whom hold
vast cross-licensed patent portfolios) could ever aord to produce software. Critics
of software idea patents also point to the fact that innovation in software has been,
and continues to be, incredibly healthy, even without the `protection' supposedly
oered by patents.
3 Communication Protocols
In dening communication protocols, there are a number of issues where the question
can be classied as open or closed. These are: trust, interoperability and interface.
3.1 Trust in Communication Protocols
When the internet was rst developed, certainty of delivery over uncertain physical
connections was the principle at work in dening the protocols for communications.
All computers attached to the network were trusted not to be the source of mali-
cious communications. Thus when the protocols of the rst individual to individual
communications tool (email) was dened (RFC 821: SMTP [Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol] in August 1982, Jon Postel) the system was designed to include the mini-
mum overhead of information exchanged to enable transfer of the important content.
As such, SMTP is a highly trusting and open protocol. A receiving machine trusts
the data provided by the sending machine in terms of the origination of the data
and by agreeing to forward messages to other recipient machines. As the internet
expanded, this trusting approach could not be maintained and many systems closed
down their willingness to forward messages to other recipients, unless the message
comes from a known source. The volume of spam long ago reached the point that
accepting mail from everywhere for forwarding is now not only discouraged but such
open mail proxies are now routinely blocked from sending messages to most of the
rest of the internet.
However, even now, reverse lookup of domain names compared to internet ad-
dresses are deemed too expensive, and more importantly too restrictive, the be
implemented on many mail receipt systems. Email is, in many ways, the victim
of its own success and constantly teetering on the brink of being overwhelmed by
12which has a license which cannot prevent distribution free of charge, and which therefore it
would be dicult to nd a way to provide the funding for patent license fees, let alone actually
track distribution to assess per-user fees, the usual basis for a patent license
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malicious use. Being a relatively light overhead (even now) communication protocol,
and given the openness of its implementation even now, a large number of emails
are program-to-person or even program-to-program communications. This provides
one of a number of barriers to a wholesale replacement of the SMTP-based email
system still in use today. The other barriers to its replacements include:
 The immense install base of email: every user online has at least one email
account and more usually more than that. Some will run hundreds of accounts
on dierent systems for dierent purposes.
 The criticality of email in person-person machine-person and machine-machine
communications, and in particular the lack of knowledge of many systems
people of exactly which protocols some of their software uses.
 The desire of governments to censor and monitor their citizens' communica-
tions produces in some circumstances a pressure from surveillance authorities
to maintain a relatively-simple-to-eavesdrop-on service, while suggestions for
authority-assigned trackable origination communication are resisted by citizens
wary of the hidden agenda of surveillance cloaked in rhetoric about reducing
malicious communications.
 The suggestions by some major players in the software industry to include pro-
prietary formats, protocols and even patented methods in revised standards.
3.2 Communication Protocols and Interoperability
Communication is all about connecting people with each other, preferably when both
of them wish to be connected. In a small network this can be handled by a variety of
means, but the numeric rules of networks mean that beyond a relatively small size
of network, scalability demands distribution of at least some authority. In addition
interoperability becomes a major issue in any denition of a communication protocol.
Take the example of instant messaging (IM). The concept of direct synchronous
communication between users has been a feature of computer communications for a
long time, the specication for IRC (internet Relay Chat: RFC 1459 May 1993 by
Oikarinen and Reed) provided an open protocol by which users could log on to a
server, select one or more channels of communication on that server, and converse
with each other with a minimum of typing overhead. This open protocol served
traditional internet user for many years and became one of the main communication
alternatives, particularly for synchronous groups discussions, along with email and
usenet. However, for the non-expert computer user AOL, Yahoo! and MS came to
dominate this communication space.
The walled garden online service of America OnLine (AOL) introduced AIM
(AOL Instant Messenger) in 1996. In 1997 they released a client for non-AOL
internet users, but still only AIM-registered users. In 1998 Yahoo! introduced
their \Yahoo! Pager" system, including the familiar buddy list feature. Again, this
system included a single log-on to the Yahoo! central server and one could only
talk to other Yahoo! users. In 1999, MS released MSN Messenger as part of its MS
Network (MSN) online oering. The original MSN Messenger client allowed users
to interoperate with both AOL and Yahoo! IM systems, by providing their account
details to the Messenger server. AOL, in particular, strongly criticised this practice
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[Hu and Junnarkar, 1999] citing security concerns but almost certainly more worried
about their market share and the advertising revenue generated by the ad-supported
standalone client as well as their own subscriber base. As we discuss below, AOL
have also attempted to block other clients from connecting to their messaging server
(claimed to be in an attempt to secure the system, but in reality almost certainly in
defense of their revenue stream). After regular alterations to the server and message
protocol made keeping changes up to date on the Messenger client impractical, MS
abandoned attempts to technologically force interoperability of IM on AOL.
For many years after their launch, each of these systems stood alone. Unlike
email which, despite eorts by many companies to appropriate it to their own pri-
vate formats remains mainly open as discussed above, these separate systems came
to dominate the instant messaging were restricted to communication with other
users on the same system. Many users maintained accounts on more than one,
sometimes all three of these dierent systems. In 2006, MS and Yahoo! launched
interoperability between their services. AOL, having been approached to join them,
still maintains its standalone network.
Despite its open denition and multitude of servers and clients, the Jabber pro-
tocol remains a small player in the IM eld. Newer services and systems such as
Facebook and the iPhone continue to challenge AOL, MS and Yahoo!'s dominance,
and internal instant messaging within organisations exist, often based on proprietary
systems such as the venerable Lotus Notes internal communication suite.
4 Data Formats
Closely linked to the issue of communication protocols are the issue of data stan-
dards. Everything from SMS (text messages) limited to 56 characters up to the
entire contents of the internet archive (formerly the wayback machine) which aims
to preserve the contents and changes of the internet for the future, is stored in data
formats of varying levels of abstraction and complexity. At base, digital data is
simply a collection of ones and zeroes. It is the interpretation of that data that
makes it meaningful and useful. In the early days of digital electronic computing,
even the interpretation of the ordering of the ones and zeroes as a binary number
was a source of format incompatibility, the \bid-endian" versus \little-endian" ap-
proach. Even now, dierent computer hardware runs on dierent endianness due
to a variety of historical and purpose-optimisation reasons beyond the scope of this
article. Digital information is valueless if its format is not understood. This may be
a deliberate part of a format, in fact, for example formatting information stored in
marked meta-data tags may be ignored by devices or programs for whom that data
is not relevant. This allows the possibility of backwards compatibility, an impor-
tant element in data formats since for many applications a universal simultaneous
upgrade can not be expected.
Data formats can be classied into three main categories: completely closed;
published but proprietary-controlled; open standards. Examples of each of these
formats include:
Closed: The MS Oce formats. Despite a badly awed process allowing the speci-
cation of MS's XML-wrapped binary formats as a \standard" MS's Oce formats,
including .doc[x], .xls[x] etc. remain closed proprietary formats. Reverse engineering
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allows some interoperability of other software, such as OpenOce.org, but this is
far from perfect due to a lack of published specication for the meaning of some of
the data.
Published Proprietary: The portable document format (PDF) developed and
maintained by Adobe Inc. The full language specication is published by Adobe
with the intent that programs other than those produced by Adobe can interpret
and produce well-dened PDF les. Changes to the format are controlled by Adobe.
Open Standards: Despite early tag proliferation in browsers and web page edi-
tors, HTML (and related formats such as CSS, XHTML etc.) is now a standard
developed and published by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). The drafts
are developed by the W3C's HTML Working Group.
As described above with regards to software licensing, choices regarding data
formats are often not given the attention they deserve in companies. In particular,
companies choosing the software they will use to run their business often ignore
the question of the format of the data they will hold. That data is crucial to
their business, and a requirement to re-produce data from scratch due to lack of
current software to interpret older data can be sucient to devalue or even close a
business. So, when considering software and data formats, businesses need to look
both forward and backwards.
4.0.1 Data Formats for Software Houses
The meaning of a data format is open to anyone with access to the source code of a
program that can interpret that data. While not the most ecient or simple of ways
to provide access to a specication, it does the job. So, if a software house produces
free software, or allows access to its source code under more or fewer conditions,
then the data format specication is discoverable by those with that access.
If one is producing a proprietary program then one may still produce data for-
mats following a published description (whether proprietary or open standard).
Adobe's Acrobat and MS's Internet Explorer are both proprietary programs using
published data formats.
Some customers, particularly public sector customers, have as part of their re-
quirements that data produced by programs is stored in a specied format (see
below on good practice for software users).
The reason for such requirements is the loss of data that has already occurred
in many organisations, particularly large public organisations who invested early
in the creation of large amounts of data. When a software or hardware com-
pany went out of business, unless the information technologists working for the
organisation were suciently on the ball, the capacity to use existing software
and hardware to produce data usable by the new systems could easily be lost
[Digital Preservation Coalition, ].
It might seem an obvious benet to allow a program to read in as many exter-
nal formats as possible, whether proprietary (one's own or the reverse-engineered
versions of other's), published or open standards. However, the brings one's own
programs at least partly into the interoperability region. While reading data format
X produced by program Y, a competitor to one's own oering Z, might provide a
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relatively simple transition route from program Y, it also allows for the possibility of
companies maintaining program Y as a main option and using a very small number
of licenses for Z where it capabilities are really needed.
Output formats are the trickier question, however. Vendor lock-in using propri-
etary formats has been the model of commercial software for almost three decades.
The examples are numerous, with reverse-engineering of the basic data format bat-
tling against deliberate obfuscation of the meaning of the data by the original rm.
As mentioned above, however, there are other options. In order to avoid losing
control to a standards body, which may move slower than user needs, and may be
subject to capture by one's opponents and used to prevent new capabilities from
reaching the market in time to secure a solid commercial advantage, the Adobe op-
tion of publishing the data standard but retaining control of it, seems very sensible.
Of course, this may still be captured by competitors branching the specication for
their own purposes (\embrace, extend extinguish").
If one does not already have a lead in the marketplace, gaining it can be very
dicult [Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996]. In this case, subscribing to standards
bodies, gaining a seat at the table, and competing on the merits of one's program-
mers and vision of user needs, may be the better option. Certainly a revolt by users
who may see the proprietary data format as a stranglehold on their own valuable
data, and upgrade or maintenance costs that rise over time as a sucient reason
to bite the bullet and change platform (likely never to return) are a risk of the
proprietary route.
4.0.2 Data Formats for Other Organisations
For organisations commissioning bespoke software/hardware or buying o-the-shelf
materials, the choice of data formats which are in some sense open to them really
should be the obvious choice. A good range of options for both input and output
formats, and adherence to data format standards, are all good for their business.
For the public sector in particular, this issue has been gaining some political traction
for some time. The diculty comes, as always, in the interoperability stakes when
other organisations work with a closed standard. In the UK for example, some
government contract documents have in the past been issued solely in MS Word
format, and required the advanced scripting facilities of Word to be completed. Not
running a professional edition of MS Word would bar an organisation from bidding
for government tenders. Direct online submission systems are tending to move away
from this desktop program model, but it can still cause problems. Digital access
and preservation strategies need careful thought alongside interoperability questions,
and the possibility of loss of everything must be weighed against the possible loss
of richness in some data.
5 Community or Customers
In these days of user generated content the phrase community is often bandied
around by those running websites where the provider is solely an intermediary be-
tween users sharing their material. There are many analyses of the economics and
social norms attaching to this idea [Surowiecki, 2004, Tapscott and Williams, 2006,
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Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, 2008, Shirky, 2008]. Here we con-
sider the attitude of organisations to their main users. Those organisations can be
etail (Amazon.com), information provision (Wikipedia.org, LATimes.com, YouTube.com),
personal introductions between users (adultfriendnder.com) social networking sites
(Facebook.com, Mixi.jp) and many others. One of the things each of these sites has
in common is that part of what they provide is generated by their users. In some
cases, e.g. Wikipedia, it is all they provide. At the other end of the scale the LA
Times online site is principally populated with the organisations' own material with
some commentary and discussion amongst users. From Amazon's customer ratings
and reviews to adultfriendnder's proles to Facebook and Mixi's blogs, photos and
friend lists, part of the buzz about these sites is their community rather than their
customers. The software industry, combining their own and their users' technical
expertise, were one of the rst types of business to see the advantage in helping
their users to communicate with one another. However, this can be a double-edged
sword. Whereas harnessing the Hacker Ethic [Himanen, 2001] of information shar-
ing provided free user support by creating a resource of experienced users willing to
share their knowledge with each other (and, crucially, with new users) it also creates
a perfect opportunity for unhappy users to report their woes to other users and po-
tential users. Of course, these days most people have ample other places to air their
poor customer experiences, but few have the fame of Eugene Volokh [Solove, 2007,
p. 93] and hence a blog post by most will barely attract any signicant attention,
but if it's more than a few complaining bitterly on an ocial site, then the organi-
sation can have real problems. When posted to an organisation-owned community
site, such comments can, perhaps, be removed, but the very act of creating a forum
where users provide most of the content is that they feel that they gain some, if not
all, of the expected free speech rights of public places [Sunstein, 2002, Klein, 2000]
and hard censorship on such sites will tend to undermine their benets in general
while possibly driving away existing customers more unhappy with the censorship
than because of the original failings.
Where the content of a site is created principally by the users, and the organ-
isation provides a structure in which to hold that content, questions of ownership
come into play. The rhetoric of publishers has long been that copyright derives from
the brilliant acts of creation performed by the artist (writer, composer, musician)
and that the long, strong and wide protection is needed to provide the deserving
creator with the just benets. of course, the fact that the middlemen have been
taking the lion's share of all the income is never mentioned. This case becomes
even more dicult when sites such as YouTube are considered. Created in 2005,
YouTube quickly gathered a huge base of video clips from users, free for other users
to view. These clips included home videos (everything from the funny antics of a
cat to political diatribes), lm student shorts and extracts from commercial ma-
terial. Even in the early days the commercial content caused some diculties for
the site operators, with complaints from music recording companies, lm companies
and television production companies. When Google acquired YouTube for in 2006
these companies redoubled their eorts to either shut YouTube down, or at the very
least acquire a share in its prots. This raises an interesting question, however,
of what Google actually bought, and from whom. The terms and conditions of
the YouTube site are that uploaders provide an irrevocable license for YouTube to
do pretty much everything they want with the material thus uploaded. In typical
middleman style this included selling the entire site to Google for $1.65b without
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ever paying existing users a cent for their content. Under various pressures, Google
introduced a prot sharing plan in 2007 to enable uploaders of very popular videos
to receive some of the advertising income that funds the service. It remains one of
the few user-generated content sites to have any form of plan. No such site to my
knowledge has shared an IPO or massive sale proceeds with their users.
6 The Anti-Malware Prisoners' Dilemma
Anti-virus software has been around for a long time. Viri and other forms of malware
have been circulating since the early days of the mini computer and the forerunner of
the internet. Anti-virus and related security software has become big business. Ma-
jor community eorts are also put into identifying both vulnerabilities and threats.
CERTs (computer emergency readiness/response teams) exist in all the developed
countries and a number of others, with local teams also in existence. The threat
and risks are seen as so important that the main US-CERT is now part of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Like much else in the world of security, most people are not very good at deal-
ing with it. Many do not install any signicant protections until they have been
badly damaged at least once, and sometimes a number of times, by malware at-
tacks. Given the potential for indirect harm from many modern malware, where the
machine in question is merely hijacked (turned into a zombie) and its network con-
nection used for the sending of spam, participation of distributed denial of service
attacks or for use in cracking high-value machines, this is an unfortunate position.
It does mean, however, that advertising and selling security software is dicult.
Competition in this marketplace is therefore quite erce. This is one area, however,
where competition probably does not produce the optimum outcome. The reason
for this is that there are two major parts to anti-malware programs. The rst is an
overseer program that monitors what is going on in the operating system and looks
for other pieces of software whose actions are out of the ordinary (accessing many
dierent types of le, adding the same code to each, for example). The second is a
set of recognition signatures for identied malware and unpatched vulnerabilities in
programs. If a piece of malware appears on the computer via any route the easiest,
quickest and most eective way for the anti-malware program to identify it is with
a software signature: some element(s) of the virus' code identied as unchanging
between minor variations.
In an ideal world these virus signatures would be freely shared between anti-
malware companies and given away free to users. However, identication of these
signatures is a time-consuming job and while some of this is done by volunteers or
CERT team members, much of it is done by paid employees of the anti-malware
company. While free sharing of the signature les would probably make all comput-
ers safer from infection, such sharing would also, particularly if not reciprocated,
reduce the competitiveness of a company's software in the security marketplace. If
Company A shares its identied signatures with everyone else, then the software
from all companies will detect the viri that Company A's software does, plus the
ones they have separately identied but not shared. In addition, it is likely that
churn13 in the marketplace is at least partly driven by failure of the existing soft-
13That is, customers shifting from one product to another.
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ware to prevent infection. So, sharing virus signatures can reduce churn, and thus
reduce the ability of companies oering better programs to gain customers dur-
ing the churn. So, instead of cooperating, the anti-malware companies defect and
everyone loses out.
7 Conclusions
When software is produced by public or non-prot organisations, the mode of op-
eration should almost certainly be some form of free software license. Not only
does this allow their programmers free reign to build on existing free software and
not re-invent the wheel, but by explicitly collaborating with other public/non-prot
organisations with similar problems to solve, a cooperative eort can yield quicker
and sturdier results than a solo eort in each organisation. The (ideally) lack of any
form of competition among public and non-prot organisations generally removes
any doubts that internal developments should be released in this way.
Similarly to public and non-prot organisations, commercial organisations should
consider building on existing free software projects, either forking them to develop
into serving their own needs or contributing to the general development of a partic-
ular project. Few pieces of software developed for in-house use are ever successfully
commercialised and building internal tools on free software can prevent managers
from following this dangerous path.
As has been shown by a number o companies, some of them major players
(IBM, RedHat, Sun) developing free software can provide valuable income. Instead
of competing with other companies for a locked-in client base paying for regular
upgrades, maintenance and support of a proprietary program, competing for busi-
ness oering a specic service can lead to a healthier long-term business. Certainly
the ethical values of the ACM and BCS where the customer, society, the developers
and the business are all seen as stakeholders in the information infrastructure, free
software is much more compatible with these values. The use of free software as a
company's oering encourages it to regard its highly skilled development sta as its
most valuable resource, and not as a cost base whose benets and salaries should be
kept down at all costs. Treating one's knowledge workers as the core of the business
ts well with the shift to the knowledge economy described by so many including
[Castells, 1996, Castells, 1997, Castells, 2000]. Regarding one's knowledge workers
as less important than the managers and sales sta is the stu of Dilbert's world
and can often be the downfall of a company, in the long if not the short term.
The arguments against patents generally have been made many times for both
philosophical [Jeerson, 1907, pp.326{338, Vol. XIII, Letter to Isaac McPherson]
and practical [Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002] reasons. The particular case against
restrictions on software are compelling:
 Without software patenting, the software industry in Europe has not imploded
nor suered from a lack of investment.
 The level of innovation in software is very high and as patents are supposed to
promote innovation by rewarding it. Since the innovation exists patents are
unnecessary.
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 Few software patents issued in the US have ever been successfully defended
against charges of lack of novelty, obviousness (to a relevant practitioner), or
published prior art.
 If the idea of the spreadsheet had been patented in 1979, the base idea would
only have dropped out of patenting in 1999. The world of computing in 1999
and that of 1979 were so radically dierent it is hard to see this as a sensible
term.
 The return on investment period for software is so variable, depending on too
many factors, for a sensible term to be valid across software.
 Software is so abstract, malleable and variable that the only beneciaries in
the long run are likely to be lawyers.
 Even for large software concerns, the risks in developing any new code would
be substantial whereas the rewards are uncertain.
Publishing the details of communication protocols usually benets the developers
of the original system using the protocol because the network multiplication factor
outweighs the detriments of increased competition. Sometimes a rst mover can gain
and maintain a closed protocol system, but they run the risk of losing their market
share very quickly (e.g. the closed protocols of Friendster, one of the early mass
appeal social networking sites lost out to the similarly closed protocols of Facebook,
although the closed protocol of AIM still puts AOL at the top of the IM market).
Protocols themselves should not be too open or trusting of information coming in.
The early days of trusting everyone on the network are long gone and there is too
much pollution in the information stream for open, trusting protocols.
Where feasible, the users of software (whether that be o-the-shelf or bespoke)
always benet from known formats. The dierences between published but owned
formats and true standards are complicated and often depend on the particular type
of document, its purposes and user base. Proprietary formats, like closed protocols,
can produce customer lock-in and dominant market share, but reverse-engineering
is likely to cause an arms race and some large customers such as governments may
well have the power to demand, or even force, the opening of a format specication.
Members of a community are more likely to be forgiving of failings than pure
customers, and to have some sort of emotional investment in the software or service
they are using. However, members of a community also have greater expectations
of responsiveness and other elements of human rights come in to play. The ACM
and BCS code of ethics, with their stress on balancing stakeholder interests in-
cluding those of customers should push computing professionals down the road of
community-building. Provided you treat your customers well and don't set out to
exploit them. the benets can far outweigh the downsides, particularly in user to
user support.
7.1 The Costs and Benets of Open-ness
Being open has its risks, particularly for things like communication protocols, where
trusting protocols are now almost always abused. By adopting an open approach in
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general, businesses can develop a more balanced approach to their activities, being
paid for what they do and will do, rather than trying to be paid for what they
have already done. Higher risks may bring higher rewards in the long run, but they
also may not. If long term value is your goal, a more open approach can produce
a more ecient economy, which can have broad benets. In particular, the use
of free software licenses, open formats and building communities should help us to
develop a more robust software infrastructure. Competition based on continuing
ability to meet user needs is healthier than one based on long-term lock-in, see-
saw (teeter-totter) economics [Hunt, 2000] and customer exploitation. Arguments
about universal interoperability are often used by companies such as Microsoft to
explain their eective-monopoly position as good for the consumer. Open formats,
clear distinctions between infrastructure, utility and productivity applications and
competition in the marketplace reduce barriers to entry, and force companies to
maintain the quality of their oerings far more than a captive market. Excess prof-
its in the software industry syphon money from elsewhere in the economy and claims
that this is healthy are an example of the Broken Window Fallacy [Bastiat, 1850].
Monopolies can also be brittle in a number of ways, including security risks associ-
ated with monocultures (if almost everyone runs a particular piece of software then
any vulnerability in that software makes it more attractive to attackers and more
devastating when an attack occurs), and the problem of one monopoly replacing
another, whereby the previous monopolist may swiftly nd themselves bankrupt.
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